These distances are based primarily on hydrogen piping releases and resultant vapor clouds and jet flames based on pipe diameter and pressure. It’s important to note that many facilities have issues such as confinement and congestion, so it may be applicable to apply contemporary engineering models to assess risk.

There is technically no upper limit for GH2 storage listed within the separation distance tables within Chapter 7 of NFPA 2. For LH2, there is a 75000-gallon upper limit for the LH2 storage separation distance tables within Chapter 8 for LH2. 
It’s important to note that many facilities have site specific issues such as large quantities, confinement, and congestion, so it may be…

The Global Asset Protection Services (GAPS) standard was written 20 years ago for property loss prevention at crowded chemical plants and is intended for existing and new oil and chemical facilities to limit explosion over-pressure and fire exposure damage; thus, the purpose is different than NFPA 2. NFPA distances were based on studies from the 1960s as well as qualitative factors that were…

Previous versions of NFPA 55 listed overhead power lines within the separation distance tables with no voltage distinction. The separation distances were 15 ft for GH2 and 25 ft for LH2 for all overhead electrical lines. The current edition of NFPA 2 includes these in overhead utilities; the distance for GH2 and LH2 will vary with pressure and diameter of the hydrogen piping. In practice, high…

Each system should be evaluated for exposure of equipment to jet fires. The design team should develop
a plan to mitigate exposure as part of the hazard analysis. Fire barriers, walls, enclosures, and insulation
systems are frequently installed to meet code requirements where separation distances are not
sufficient or where the probability of exposure to a jet fire is high. Barriers…

Codes and standards to address issues like this one are under development, along with applied research and field trials. As with any new application, appropriate codes and standards must be developed to meet public risk targets.

Flammable hydrogen releases can result in deflagration and transition to a detonation. Whether the
deflagration transitions to a detonation depends on numerous parameters such as cloud size, hydrogen
concentration, confinement, and congestion. Releases into confined or congested areas are more
susceptible to generating significant deflagration over-pressures and more likely to…

Systems should be sited in accordance with national and local standards such as NFPA 2, Hydrogen
Technologies Code. The nature of a trailer filling operation is not much different than a vehicle fueling
station, so the hazards are comparable and similar safeguards such as walls and sensors will apply. These
facilities might be larger and industrial standards and regulations will also…

Exposure between these products is bidirectional. A hazard analysis should consider what happens to
alternate fueling equipment if an incident with one of the fuels occurs. Care must be taken to have the
appropriate separation distance and mitigations according to the applicable codes. Limited experience
with existing stations has shown that these multi-fuel stations can be successful…

There are numerous models that can be used to assess the consequence and risk of leaks and releases.
One such model is HYRAM which is publicly available from Sandia and the US DOE.